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This paper provides evidence on the role of net fiscal transfers to households and EU 
structural funds for per-capita output convergence across a large sample of European 
regions during the period 1995-2005. We find that net fiscal transfers, while achieving 
regional redistribution, seem to impede output growth and promote an “immiserising 
convergence”: output growth rates in poor receiving regions decline by less than in 
rich paying regions. EU structural and cohesion funds spent during 1994-1999 had a 
positive, but slight, impact on future economic growth, mainly through the human 
development component. 
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Non-technical summary  
 
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the role of net fiscal transfers and EU 
structural funds policy for income and output convergence across European regions.  
We analyse the aggregate impact of taxation and transfers on income and output 
convergence across a large sample of European regions, covering 19 EU member states 
during the period 1995-2005. The analysis is based on NUTS-2 regions, which are 
targeted by the European Commission in its evaluation of regional income disparities. 
We later include in the analysis the amounts of structural and cohesion funds spent at 
regional level during the period 1994-1999. 
As regards our empirical investigation, we first use simple models of convergence of 
output and income indicators (household primary income and disposable income) and, 
thus, indirectly account for the role of fiscal transfers. To begin, we look at measures of 
per-capita income and output dispersion, or σ-convergence. Further, we compare the 
speeds of convergence as given by an absolute β-convergence model for household 
primary income, household disposable income and output per capita. 
The conclusion from this analysis is that there has been a process of convergence 
across the European regions under study in terms of both per-capita output and income. 
The evidence of within country convergence is much more limited, primarily restricted to 
Italy. We find that disposable income across European regions in EU-19 converges 
during the period 1995-2005 at a higher speed than primary income, with the lowest 
speed obtained for output per capita. Since the difference between primary income and 
disposable income is given by the net impact of taxes and transfers, government 
intervention seems to lead to lower disparities among regions in terms of income 
ultimately available for households. On the other hand, given that the main difference 
between GDP per capita and household primary income per capita is explained by the 
commuting flows of workers, labour mobility appears to be particularly important for the 
process of income adjustment.  
Our main empirical model is given by a system of simultaneous equations that 
captures the relationship between net fiscal transfers to households, labour mobility, and 
economic growth. Hence, we capture the impact of net fiscal transfers on output growth 
and labour mobility while taking into account the endogenous nature of net fiscal 
transfers, that is, relatively higher net transfers are granted to poorer regions. Regarding 
data construction, for net fiscal transfers we use the ratio between household disposable 
income and primary income, while for labour mobility we can capture only short-distance 
mobility or labour commuting.  
We find that net fiscal transfers impede, on average, the output growth. Moreover, 
when we divide the sample into two (“receiving regions and marginal payers” and 
“heavily taxed regions”), we find a negative impact of net transfers on growth in the 
former group, and an even higher negative impact of net taxes on growth in the latter 
group. This points to a process of “immiserising convergence”, with output growth rates 
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There is also some evidence that fiscal transfers impede labour commuting with 
higher net transfers reducing outward labour mobility. While this seems to be beneficial 
for economic growth (higher outward labour implies lower per-capita GDP growth), it is 
likely to impede factor adjustment. Yet, using population migration as an alternative 
variable, higher net transfers seem to be associated with higher outward migration. 
We also account for the amounts spent during 1994-1999 out of the EU structural and 
cohesion funds. It seems that such funds have a slight positive impact on future economic 
growth, mainly through the human development component, but the results do not seem 
to be robust when country dummies are included. 
While this is a preliminary investigation for the EU-19 regions as a pool, further 
research is needed to bolster these conclusions, especially investigating more thoroughly 
the national policy dimension of the regional convergence process, looking in more 












The process of economic convergence at the regional level has been analysed extensively 
in the literature. Yet, the role of fiscal policy tools for convergence has been less 
thoroughly investigated empirically, at either country or regional level. On the one hand 
this is because the theoretical literature is still not clear about the contribution of fiscal 
policy, especially taxation and other distributional measures, to long-term growth and 
convergence. On the other hand there is a lack of reliable and consistent fiscal data at the 
regional level.  
Knowing the impact of fiscal transfers on convergence is important for policy 
makers at both national and European levels. When deciding on measures that affect 
regional transfers, policy makers need to take into account the costs in terms of the 
distortions they induce on the side of the net payers as well as the net recipients. In 
particular, the pursuit of regional redistribution objectives must give due consideration to 
the cost of forgone or impeded economic growth.  
   In this paper, we provide evidence on the role of fiscal redistribution policies for 
output convergence across European regions. We analyse the impact of net transfers to 
households, and EU structural funds, on per-capita output convergence across a large 
sample of European regions, covering 19 EU member states
5 during the period 1995-
2005. We also briefly investigate the role of fiscal transfers for income dispersion across 
the European regions.  
We base the analysis on NUTS-2 regions,
6 which are targeted by the European 
Commission in its evaluation of regional income disparities. Our sample includes 230 
NUTS-2 regions (listed in Appendix 1), for which various measures of regional per-
capita income and output are available from Eurostat for the period from 1995 to 2005.
7 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that uses a proxy for a fiscal policy 
variable to investigate economic convergence across European regions. We construct the 
variable net transfers as the ratio between household disposable income and primary 
income, thus capturing the aggregate impact of taxation and other distributional policy 
measures. Our main empirical model is given by a system of simultaneous equations that 
captures the relationship between net fiscal transfers to households, labour mobility, and 
economic growth. Hence, we capture the impact of net fiscal transfers on output growth 
and labour mobility while taking into account the endogenous nature of net fiscal 
transfers, that is, relatively higher net transfers being directed to poorer regions. At the 
same time, it should be noted that governments can use a range of additional tools to 
foster regional convergence which are not covered in this paper. These include 
                                                 
5 The 19 EU countries of this study are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom. The exclusion of eight EU member states is due to the lack of regional data 
and in some cases (e.g. Romania) the availability of only short time series. 
6 The acronym NUTS stands for “Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics” and is a code standard 
developed by the EU to reference the administrative sections of a country statistically.  
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investment in infrastructure and human capital formation as well as corporate subsidies 
differentiated by region. 
We find that net fiscal transfers contribute to income convergence (the 
distributional effect), but they also seem to impede, on average, output growth. Moreover, 
when we divide the sample into two (“receiving regions and marginal payers” and 
“heavily taxed regions”) we find a negative impact of net transfers on growth in the 
former group, and an even higher negative impact of net taxes on growth in the latter 
group. This result points to a process of “immiserising convergence”
8 with output growth 
rates in receiving poor regions declining by less than in paying rich regions in reaction to 
the tax-transfer scheme. 
  The paper is structured as follows. After the present introduction, the second 
chapter introduces a short literature review of the theoretical and empirical aspects of the 
role of fiscal policy on economic growth and income convergence. It includes a review of 
the main results from the regional convergence studies across European regions. The 
third chapter presents simple empirical models to investigate convergence of per capita 
output and income indicators taking into account the role of fiscal transfers. First, it looks 
at measures of per capita income and output dispersion or σ-convergence. Further, it 
compares the speeds of convergence as given by an absolute β-convergence model for 
household primary income, household disposable income and output per capita. The 
fourth chapter contains our main empirical model and investigates with various panel and 
cross-sectional datasets the role of fiscal transfers on output convergence, with a focus on 
modelling the endogenous character of fiscal transfers. The last part concludes and 
contains recommendations for future research. 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
The process of economic convergence at regional level has been extensively analysed in 
the literature.  A series of studies beginning with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990; 1992a), 
Barro et al. (1991) and continuing with Coulombe and Lee (1995); Shioji (2001); Rey 
and Montouri (1999) among many others, find evidence of absolute and conditional β-
convergence
9 across U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, Canadian provinces and European 
regions.  
                                                 
8 The term is reminiscent of Bhagwati’s (1958) “immiserizing growth.” Bhagwati used it in the context of 
international trade to denote the paradox that growth-induced deterioration in the terms of trade would 
outweigh the primary gain from growth so that the country could end up worse off (see Bhagwati (2008) 
for the description and origin of the term). In the case of the present paper, we use the term to denote the 
unintended effect of net transfers on convergence, i.e. even if convergence may be supported, it comes at 
the cost of a worse situation in both poor receiving and rich paying regions.   
9 Empirically, the so-called “β-convergence” model (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1990, 1991, 1992a), arguably 
the most popular empirical model of convergence, tests whether in the long run the growth rate of per 
capita income across countries/regions is inversely correlated with the starting level of income per capita. 
In an absolute β-convergence model, the growth rate is regressed only on the initial level of per-capita 
income, while a conditional β-convergence model controls for other differences in cross-sectional units that 
could produce different steady-state growth rates.  
8
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Evidence of decreasing income disparities over long periods of time, or σ-
convergence,
10 has also been unveiled across regions, although it is more difficult to find 
it over shorter periods. For instance, Sala-i-Martin (1996) finds evidence of σ-
convergence in several EU countries in a long-term analysis over five decades, while 
Boldrin and Canova (2001) and Bouvet (2007) fail to uncover similar patterns for shorter 
term analysis ranging from one to three decades. Models of distributional dynamics do 
not find evidence of income polarization or convergence clubs across U.S. states (Quah 
1996b; Johnson 2000), but there is some evidence of two-club income convergence 
among European regions if the new member states are included (Fischer and Stumpner 
2007).  
Regarding the role of fiscal policy in the process of economic convergence, the 
existing literature has identified several ways in which such a role can be investigated.  
  First, the impact of fiscal transfers on economic growth can be indirectly extended 
to economic convergence: if poorer regions receive fiscal transfers that could accelerate 
their growth rates relative to richer regions, then these instruments could contribute to 
reinforcing economic convergence. On the other hand, as argued in Barro (1999), transfer 
payments and the associated tax finance will generally distort economic decisions; a 
greater level of income redistribution induces more distortions, tends to reduce 
investment, and thus slow down economic growth. Furthermore, transfers and other 
distributional fiscal measures that are targeted at reducing income disparities could have 
the perverse effect of reducing labour mobility and thus hampering an automatic process 
of adjustment. The process of adjustment after asymmetric shocks, particularly relevant 
in a monetary union, can be a short-term indication for the capacity of regional 
economies to achieve long-term economic convergence, and particularly for the speed 
with which such convergence is achieved. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992a) discuss the 
importance of extending the neoclassical growth model to allow for “migration of 
persons,” considered as “another force that promotes convergence of per capita product 
and income across economies.”
11 
  Obstfeld and Peri (1998) investigate the role of fiscal policy in regional 
adjustment after asymmetric shocks within a single currency area. They conclude that the 
key regional adjustment mechanisms should be (i) labour mobility and (ii) local relative 
price responses, while (iii) interregional transfer payments can be helpful in riding out 
temporary real shocks. They also find that outside the US (Germany, Italy, Canada, UK), 
there is a higher reliance on interregional transfer payments, less on labour migration, and 
the pace of regional adjustment appears to be slower. However, the high persistence of 
stabilizing transfers, even in the US, suggests their role goes beyond that of temporarily 
cushioning cyclical shocks. Rather, they represent long-lived inflows to regions 
confronting macroeconomic difficulties, and as such, contribute to a postponement of 
labour and price adjustments. 
                                                 
10 σ-convergence treats the movement in time of the variance (or standard deviation, hence the name σ) of a 
cross-sectional income distribution. The two terms, σ and β-convergence, are coined “the classical 
approach to convergence” in Sala-i-Martin (1996). β-convergence is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for σ-convergence (Sala-i-Martin 1996; Furceri 2005). 
11 However, in the estimations, including net labour migration as an explanatory variable in the growth 
equations affects only marginally the β coefficient of convergence.  
9
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  Kaufman et al. (2003) study the role of federal transfers in the process of 
economic convergence across Canadian provinces by looking directly at the impact of 
equalization payments on growth, and indirectly at the impact of employment insurance 
schemes on migration. They find that the equalization payments may have helped spur 
the process of output convergence, while the employment support scheme seems to have 
deterred convergence by discouraging migration across Canadian provinces.  
  Second, and related to the first approach, the role of fiscal policy for the process 
of convergence may be investigated by looking at σ-convergence, or how measures of 
income and output dispersion are influenced by fiscal variables. In this vein, Bouvet  
(2007) seeks to explain regional output inequality within 13 EU countries during the 
period 1977-2003, and uses social transfers as an explanatory fiscal variable. Somewhat 
surprisingly, social transfers are found significant in reducing output inequality only 
when Greece, Spain and Portugal (countries that received the largest support from the 
EU) are excluded from the analysis.   
  Third, some insights as to the impact of fiscal policy on income convergence may 
be revealed by comparing the convergence rates across various income indicators, such 
as per-capita GDP, personal income, and personal disposable income. The difference 
between the last two reflects the effect of tax and redistribution policies. Using this 
approach, Coulombe and Lee (1995) find that per-capita disposable income across 
Canadian provinces converges faster than personal income for the period 1961-1991, 
while the speed of convergence is the slowest for regional GDP per capita. They 
conclude that convergence has been helped by government transfers and taxes, but this 
refers only to income convergence, and they do not discuss the impact on output 
convergence.   
  Finally, in the case of European regions, the role and effectiveness of regional 
structural funds and other programs of fiscal support for backward regions can be 
investigated indirectly by comparing the economic growth rates and/or the dynamics of 
income distributions separately for regions that are recipients of such funds and for the 
other regions. In this vein, Boldrin and Canova (2001) investigate the role of European 
regional policies in promoting convergence in output per capita during the period 1980-
1996. They conclude that there is no evidence that structural and cohesion funds regions 
behave differently from others or display any form of systematic catching-up with the 
rest of regional income distribution. However, others (European Commission 2001; 
Cappelen et al. 2001; Beugesdijk and Eijffinger 2003) found an opposite result. Martin 
(1999) finds some empirical support for the convergence model across the European 
regions during the 1980s and early 1990s, but concludes that a fast, automatic catch-up 
process is unlikely and that regional policy instruments can have a positive impact on 
regional convergence. As summarised in Tondl (2004), the overall evidence on this 
account is mixed.  
  Our paper builds upon this literature and expands its finding by using a 
comprehensive methodological approach applied at a cross-national regional level. We 
base our analysis on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, 1991) in terms of conditional 
convergence, and Obstfeld and Peri (1998) in terms of the role of long-lived fiscal 
transfers on labour mobility adjustments. For our empirical investigation, we build on 
Coulombe and Lee’s (1995) comparison of convergence across income and output per 
10
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capita, and continue with an empirical model similar to the one used in Kaufman et al. 
(2003).  
 
III. A simple empirical investigation 
 
As a first step in our empirical investigation, we take a look at convergence across three 
different indicators, namely GDP per capita, household primary income and household 
disposable income. Differences in the convergence rate of the three indicators (absolute 
β-convergence), as well as in the trend of their dispersion (σ-convergence), give an 
indication to what extent policy measures and other factor have contributed to regional 
convergence over the sample period.  
 
We first look at the dynamics over time of output and income disparities (σ-
convergence) across the 230 regions in the 19 countries under study, and separately for 
the 199 regions in the 13 old EU countries). We calculate and compare the rates of β-
convergence for three analytical measures. The indicators are expressed in purchasing 
power terms per capita, relative to the EU-19 average: regional GDP is expressed in 
purchasing power standards (PPS), and the income variables are treated accordingly, i.e. 
recalculated by Eurostat using PPS for private consumption (known as PPCS, purchasing 
power consumption standards). By using PPS relative to the EU-19 average: (1) we 
capture the differences in the cost of living across countries (but not across regions since 
conversion to PPS is done by Eurostat on the basis of national purchasing power parities); 
and (2) cushion against the impact of shocks common to all regions, while avoiding the 
problem of using arbitrary price deflators.  
The difference between the three indicators provides an insight into the 
importance of labour migration and redistribution policies. In particular, according to the 
Eurostat methodology, the difference between GDP (output) and primary income of 
households comes primarily from the flow of commuting workers. This is because the 
first measure is based on the place-of-work, while the second measure is based on the 
place-of-residence. Additional differences reflect the balance of primary income (other 
than labour’s) from outside the region, and the fixed capital consumption. Regarding 
redistribution policies, the difference between household primary income and disposable 
income reflects the impact of net government transfers on household income. These 
comprise redistribution mechanisms through social benefits and other transfers, as well as 
income and wealth taxes and social security contributions. Table A1 of Appendix 2 
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III.1. Regional income and output dispersion: A look at σ-convergence  
 
Chart 1 presents the dispersion (standard deviation) of relative regional income, 
disposable income, and GDP per capita over the period 1995-2004.
12 The chart shows the 
dispersion measures for the pooled 230 regions, while Chart 2 reflects the dispersion 
measures within each country (and thus does not reflect between-country variation). By 
using the same scale at country level, Chart 2 also provides a crude comparison of 
national regional inequalities between the EU countries.  
 
Chart 1: σ-convergence across all regions in EU-13 and EU-19 
 
Note: EU-13 refers to regions in the following “old” EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Finland, 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom; 






                                                 
12 For regional dispersion within each country, the period 1994-2005 is shown for all countries except Italy, 
for which 2005 data were not available. 
12
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1995  2000 2005  1995  2000 20051995 2000 2005  1995  2000 2005
Austria Belgium Czech Republic Finland
France Germany Greece Ireland
Italy  Netherlands Poland Portugal
Slovakia Spain Sweden United Kingdom
Income  Disposable Income  GDP
Year
Graphs by country 
 
Note: Excludes Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, each classified as a single NUTS-2 region. Regional data are 
available for the period 1995-2005 for all countries except Italy (only up to 2004). 
 
Several preliminary conclusions emerge from the examination of these trends: 
First, looking at Chart 1 income dispersion across all regions decreased during the 10-
year period under study, providing some evidence for σ-convergence. This holds for both 
the whole sample and for the old EU-13. The evidence is less clear for output dispersion: 
inequalities among regions in terms of GDP-per capita remained broadly the same in the 
old EU-13 and declined slightly in the whole sample. 
Second, when regional income disparities are examined within each country, Italy is 
the only country displaying a pronounced declining trend in regional inequality over the 
observation period. For the other countries, regional income and output dispersion 
remained either flat (most importantly in Germany) or increased (particularly in the new 
member states, such as Slovakia and Czech Republic, but also in the United Kingdom 
and Ireland
13). In combination with the finding from the pooled observations in Chart 1, 
                                                 
13 Ireland is divided in only two NUTS2 regions 
13
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this implies that the rest of the reduction in the overall regional inequality owes to the 
reduction of between-country disparities.  
  Third, the highest regional inequality is observed virtually across the board for 
relative output per capita, followed by household primary income, while the lowest 
inequality among regions is recorded for household disposable income. The difference 
between primary income and disposable reflects the impact of taxes and transfers. In 
other words, government intervention seems to lead to lower disparities among regions in 
terms of income ultimately available for households. On the other hand, given that the 
main difference between GDP per capita and household primary income per capita is 
explained to a large extent by the flow of commuting workers, labour mobility appears to 
be particularly important for the process of primary income adjustment.  
Finally, as regards the dynamics of inequality, while both income and disposable 
income disparities follow broadly the same declining trend over time, the reduction in 
output disparity is much more subdued—a slight decline is observed for the whole EU-19 
group of regions, but disparities remain broadly flat for the old EU countries. This may 
be a first indication that government intervention did not contribute as much to output 
convergence during the 10-year period under study. On the other hand, the big and 
growing gap between GDP dispersion and the primary income dispersion (especially for 
the old EU member states and, within countries, for Belgium, Austria, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, as well as for Czech Republic and Slovakia) suggests the important role of 
commuter flows in reducing income disparities across regions, while contributing to 
output agglomeration (labour flows to richer regions).    
 
III.2. Evidence of absolute β-convergence  
 
Broadly similar conclusions emerge from the analysis of absolute β-convergence. The 
evidence for output convergence is stronger than found above, which reflects the fact that 
β-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for σ-convergence. 
  Regressions of the growth rates on the initial levels for all three indicators—per 
capita GDP, primary income and disposable income—show a negative, strongly 
statistically significant β coefficient, for both EU-19 and the old EU-13. The results 
remain robust independent of the approach. In particular, we use (i) a longer-term 
approach, i.e. regress the average annual growth rate over the entire period 1995-2005 on 
the levels in 1990 in a cross-sectional setting, (ii) a shorter term approach with annual 
panel data (regress annual growth rate γt; t+1 on levels in the preceding year Yt) and (iii) a 
two period-panel with 5-year lags (regress the average annual growth rate γt;t+5 on levels 
Yt).  
Similar to Coulombe and Lee (1995) for Canadian provinces, we find that the 
speed of convergence across European regions is the highest for disposable income and 
declines for primary income and even more for output.
14 This  provides  additional 
                                                 
14 This result remains robust to the three types of regression time-frames described above, as well as to 
using the fixed effects estimator in the panel settings. In this latter case, we obtain conditional β-
convergence with each region converging to its own steady-state, as described in Islam (1995). 
14
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evidence that government transfer policies did contribute to reducing the dispersion in 
regional disposable income per capita. 
 
Table 1: Beta coefficients in absolute convergence models, European regions, 1995-2005 
Variable  EU-19     EU-13    
   Cross-sectional           
   Beta  n  beta  n  
GDP/cap -1.5  230  -1.2  199 
Income/cap -1.7  230  -2.3  199 
Disposable 
income/cap -2.0  230  -2.3  199 
   Panel (random effects)       
   Yearly growth rates (T=9)       
   Beta  nT  beta  nT 
GDP/cap -1.9  2070  -1.5  1791 
Income/cap -2.1  2026  -2.91  1747 
Disposable 
income/cap -2.6  2026  -2.93  1747 
   5-year annual average growth rates (T=2)    
   Beta  nT  beta  nT 
GDP/cap -1.9  460  -1.6  398 
Income/cap -2.0  460  -2.7  398 
Disposable 
income/cap -2.5  460  -2.8  398 
 
 
IV. The empirical model and results 
 
Building on the outcome of the descriptive analysis above, we proceed with the empirical 
investigation of the impact of government transfers on output convergence in a multi-
equation framework. We base our analysis on Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990, 1991) in 
terms of conditional convergence, and Obstfeld and Peri (1998). The latter find that long-
lived fiscal transfers with redistributional effects may lead to a postponement of labour 
mobility adjustments, and thus hamper the ability of regional economies to handle 
idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks, and ultimately impede growth in the respective 
economies.  
We posit that the relationship between fiscal transfers to households, labour 




1. Growth rate of relative GDP/cap = f (Initial level of relative GDP/cap; Net fiscal  
transfers; Labour mobility;  controls; constant) 
2. Labour mobility = f (Relative GDP/cap; Net fiscal transfers; Unemployment; constant)  
3. Net fiscal transfers = f (Relative income/cap; constant) 
                                                 
15 This is similar to the empirical specification in Kaufman et al. (2003). 
15
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We use a simultaneous equation model as our primary methodology to account 
for both the direct and indirect effects of fiscal transfers on economic growth and output 
convergence, and to factor in the endogenous nature of fiscal transfers. Net fiscal 
transfers may impact output convergence indirectly through the impact on labour 
mobility: by deterring labour mobility, net fiscal transfers could slow down economic 
adjustment and long-term convergence. A direct effect may result from induced 
distortions in economic decisions resulting from a higher average fiscal burden and 
potential crowding out effects.  
In equation 1., we assume that the growth rate in relative per capita-output 
depends directly on (i) the initial level of income: a negative coefficient will indicate 
convergence in output per capita; (ii) (relative) net fiscal transfers; (iii) labour mobility; 
and (iv) other controls. For other control variables,
16 we use (i) regional investment as 
percent of GDP; (ii) the proportion of the labour force working in agriculture as a proxy 
for the regional economic structure; and (iii) time dummies to capture shocks common to 
all regions (time dummies are also used in the other two equations).  
In equation 2., we model labour mobility to depend on (i) the level of relative 
output per capita (higher relative output is likely to encourage inward labour migration); 
(ii) the level of (relative) net fiscal transfers to households; (iii) the (relative) 
unemployment rate (the higher the unemployment rate in a region, the more labour is 
expected to flow outside that region).  
In equation 3., we control for the endogenous nature of net fiscal transfers. The 
fiscal redistribution process implies that transfers are granted to poorer regions. Similarly, 
with progressive taxation, households in these regions also pay relatively lower taxes. We 
then posit that net transfers depend negatively on the level of relative income per capita 
(the higher the income of a region relative to the average, the lower the amount of net 
inward fiscal transfers).  
Regarding data availability, harmonized fiscal data by region are not available 
from the Eurostat. Hence, for the net fiscal transfers variable, we use as a proxy the ratio 
between per capita disposable income and primary income.
17 This reflects the net impact 
of transfers received and taxes paid by households in a region, or net inward transfers by 
region.  
To proxy the labour mobility variable, we use the ratio between a region’s number 
of resident employees working outside the region and those working inside.
18 This 
                                                 
16 The use of other controls is partly determined by the availability of harmonized regional data  
Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer et al. (2004) investigate the significance of 67 explanatory variables in cross-
country models of growth, using a Bayesian approach to construct estimates by averaging OLS coefficients 
across models. Out of 18 variables found to be significantly related to long-term growth, the strongest 
evidence was found for three—the relative price of investment, the initial rate of primary school enrolment, 
and the initial level of real GDP per capita, the last being relevant for β-convergence. We would have 
preferred to use a proxy for human capital endowment at regional level, e.g. educational attainment, but 
data is not available. 
17 Such a measure is also suggested in Obstfeld and Peri (1998) as a proxy for fiscal transfers. Another 
measure we tried and which yielded similar results is relative transfers (or the ratio of disposable Income to 
primary Income relative to the EU-19 average).  
18 Only these variables are available from Eurostat in terms of labour mobility. 
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gauges net outward labour commuting or short-distance labour mobility. We also use the 
Population migration variable by region to take into account long distance mobility,
19 but 
this measure is not restricted to labour flows only. 
Table A2 in the second appendix shows the details of data sources and 
construction, and presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical 
analysis.   
 
IV.1. Results with the full sample 
 
Since labour data at NUTS-2 level is available only starting from 1999, we conduct the 
analysis for the period 1999-2005 (with T=6 years). We find conditional convergence in 
output per capita across the pooled European regions, as reflected by the negative and 
highly statistically significant coefficient of the initial level of GDP/capita (Table 2).  
 
Table 2: Direct and indirect impact of net fiscal transfers on output growth and convergence;  
Simultaneous equation system, pooled time - cross-section data (1999-2005) 














Relative GDP/cap_t (ln) 
-3.976***   
(1.187) 
-29.363***   
(4.705)     
Net transfers_t  
-.137**  
  (.059) 
-2.002***   
(.337)     
Investment/gdp_t  
.012  
 (.024)      
Agriculture share_t 
-.247*** 
  (.083)    
Labour mobility_t  
-.109** 
  (.020)      
Unemployment_t    -.192 
  (.1849)   
Relative income/cap_t (ln)     -18.261***   
(.707)   



















15544.3    
 15671.2 
NT 815 
As regards the impact of net fiscal transfers on output convergence, first, we find 
that net transfers have on average a direct negative and significant effect on economic 
growth. As discussed above, the estimation takes into account the endogenous nature of 
net fiscal transfers, i.e. the fact that net transfers depend on the level of relative income 
                                                 
19 And to capture a longer time span (1995-2004) since labour data is available from Eurostat only starting 
with 1999.  
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per capita: a negative and highly statistically significant relationship is found in the third 
equation—the higher the relative income per capita in a region, the lower the amount of 
net transfers households receive on average. 
Turning to the labour mobility equation (eq. 2), while the rate of unemployment is 
not statistically significant (either measured in absolute terms or relative to the EU-19 
average), the level of output per capita is significant and has a negative sign: higher 
output per capita means that relatively fewer employees leave the region to commute to 
other regions. This may be evidence for economic agglomeration: richer regions attract 
more workers and grow further. Moreover, we find that net transfers have a negative, 
statistically significant impact on outward labour mobility, holding constant the level of 
output per capita and unemployment: The higher the net fiscal transfers to a region, the 
fewer of its employed labour force commutes outside the region, i.e. more labour stays in 
the region. This may imply a positive impact on economic growth (in the first equation, 
lower outward labour mobility means a higher growth rate as given by the negative, 
statistically significant coefficient of the labour variable). However, at the same time, by 
deterring labour mobility, higher net transfers may prevent necessary adjustment in 
factors and impede the capacity of regional economies to respond to shocks and achieve 
faster output convergence.  
  Finally, as regards the impact of the control variables, regions with a high share of 
income coming from agriculture seem to have grown at a lower rate on average.  The 
share of investment in regional GDP is not found significant in determining economic 
growth in this specification.
20  
We conducted a number of robustness checks whose results are available upon 
request. In particular, we address possible autocorrelation in the time dimension, as well 
as issues regarding the econometric methodology. Furthermore, we expand the sample 
backwards (albeit at the cost of having to replace the labour mobility variable by 
population migration). Finally we add country dummies to adjust for possibly different 
intercepts.  
Hence, we first estimated the system using cross-sectional data since annual 
cross-section time-series data may be subject to serial autocorrelation and idiosyncratic 
short term fluctuations (the common ones are controlled for by time dummies). For the 
dependent variable, we used the average annual growth rate over the period 1999-2005, 
and for the explanatory variables (except the initial level of GDP/cap), we use either six-
year averages (1999-2004), or the level at the beginning of the period, i.e. in 1999 to 
mitigate simultaneity and estimate a lagged impact of these variables on growth. The 
results are similar with those obtained above: net fiscal transfers turn to be statistically 
significant and have a direct negative impact on growth while deterring labour mobility.  
Second, various methodological robustness checks related to the estimation of a 
single consolidated growth equation (linking growth rates directly to the initial level of 
                                                 
20 Unexpectedly, this variable proves to be very volatile across various models that we used. For instance, 
for the period 1995-2005 in a consolidated equation, investment has a positive significant impact on growth, 
with a regression in medians, but not with dynamic panel models, panels random effects, or 2SLS when 
investment is instrumented through its lags. For the period 1999-2005, investment has a positive significant 
effect with a panel feasible GLS model and 2SLS when instrumented through its previous three lags. 
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output per capita, net transfers, labour migration, and all our control variables) were 
implemented as follows: 
(i) panel or cross-section: using the random effects estimator (RE); feasible 
generalised least square (FGLS); instrumental variables (IV) with the variable net 
Transfers instrumented by all its lags
21; OLS with cross-section in which the explanatory 
variables are averaged over the period of the analysis or are lagged at the beginning of the 
period
22; 
(ii) dynamic panel models: using the Arellano-Bond (difference GMM) and 
Blundell-Bond (system GMM) estimators. 
(iii) panel estimation eliminating outliers
23  and pooled regression in medians 
(simple, or bootstrap simultaneous quintile regressions).  
The direct impact of net transfers on growth remains negative and statistically 
significant across these specifications.  
Third, we expanded our data span to the ten year-period for which output and 
income data was available (1995-2005). Given the limited availability of labour mobility 
data, we replaced the labour mobility variable with population migration. In this case, 
while the direct negative impact of transfers on growth remained unchanged, the impact 
on population migration was the opposite of the one on labour commuting: higher net 
transfers are associated with more outward population migration. One explanation may 
be that for the broader population, the level of wealth in a region is the definitive factor 
and this has an impact also on the perception of fiscal transfers (higher transfers are 
associated with poorer regions).  
Finally, we included country dummies in the base line regression as well as the 
one with the extended sample period. Inclusion of country dummies requires constraining 
the model to “within-country convergence.” In this specification, the significant impact 
of both net transfers and the initial level of GDP/capita on growth disappeared in the 
1999-2005 model, but the results remained similar in the 1995-2005 model. The inclusion 
of country dummies did not affect the significance of regressors in the labour mobility 
equation.  
 
                                                 
21  This was the specification for which the Hansen J statistic test (equivalent of Sargan test under 
heteroskedasticity) did not reject the null of valid overidentifying restrictions, i.e. that the excluded 
instruments are not correlated with the error term and are correctly excluded. Using fewer lags did not 
change the sign or the significance of net transfers (the size of the impact is reduced, as expected), but the 
Sargan/Hansen J test rejected the null. 
22 Under the simple OLS-estimated cross-section regressions, the net transfers variable loses significance. 
Yet, it becomes again significant and negatively associated with growth when the period is extended to ten 
years (1995 – 2005), and labour mobility is replaced by population migration.  
23 We found several extreme outliers in our dependent variable, that is, the relative output growth rate for 
the Greek regions in the year 2000 (associated with hosting the Olympic Games). It is interesting to note 
that while Athens recorded the highest annual growth rate of per capita output (relative to the average) of 
the whole sample, 20.5%, other Greek regions faced the largest declines in the same year: Voreio Aigaio    
-25.7%; Dytiki Makedonia -21.5%; Sterea Ellada  -20.7%; Kentriki Makedonia -15.7%; Thessalia -14.1%). 
When we eliminate these regions from our dataset, the results remain robust: fiscal transfers continue to 
have a negative impact on growth in all our specifications. 
19
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1029
March 2009 
IV.2. Results with the split sample 
 
While these results show the average impact of net transfers on growth, the approach so 
far does not distinguish between regions that pay in and regions that receive transfers. 
Our net transfer variable (i.e. the ratio between disposable and primary per capita 
income) ranges from 65.6%
24 to 109.9%. In other words, the households in the richest 
regions pay up to one third of their income as net transfers while households in the 
poorest regions receive transfers of up to 10% of their primary income. For a list of the 
largest payers and receivers and their relative GDP per capita, see Tables A3.1. and A3.2. 
in Appendix 2. Chart A3.3. shows the inverse relationship between average relative 
output and average transfers over the 10 year period of our analysis.  
To distinguish between the two groups, we split the sample into two (see Chart 
A3.4. in Appendix 2). A search over a range of threshold values for net transfers points to 
a level of 84% as the dividing line between the harmful effect of taxation and that of 
receiving transfers.  
The regression results are reported in Table 3. In particular, for regions whose 
disposable income is below 84% of primary income (call the group “heavily taxed 
regions”), we find a positive impact of the variable net transfers on output growth, i.e., 
higher taxes have a negative impact on growth. Conversely, for regions whose disposable 
income is above 84% (call the group “receiving regions and marginal payers”), we find a 
negative impact of net transfers on output growth, which means that increasing fiscal 
transfers (or reducing taxes from an already low level) would also have a detrimental 
impact on growth. This suggests that the growth-impeding impact of distortive taxation is 
identified only above a minimum level, whereas the impact of transfers can be 
established at all levels.  
                                                 
24 If we eliminate the Greek region Ionia Nisia, whose value for the variable transfers is 59% only in 2004, 
compared to 86% - 93% for all other years.  
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Table 3: Direct and indirect impact of net fiscal transfers on output convergence (1999 – 
2005): Splitting the sample based on the net transfer threshold found at 84% 
  System 1  
Net transfers < 84 
System 2  



























1.104   
(1.817) 
-47.084***   
(5.888)      -7.20***   
(1.564) 
-6.197   
(4.771)     
Net transfers_t  
.431**   
(.193) 
-7.052***   
(.964)      -387***   
(.131) 
.039 
  (.619)     
Investment/gdp_t  
.101*   
(.056)       -.037  
(.030)      
Agriculture 
 share_t 
-.198   
(.414)      -.240***   
(.088)     
Labour mobility_t 
-.016   
(.026)       -.181***   
(.043)      
Unemployment_t     1.892***   
(.573)      -.817***   
(.147)   
Relative 
income/cap_t 
   -8.153***   
(.359)       -10.638***   
(.530)   





































10911.4   
11031.1 
NT 192  622 
Although the “heavily taxed regions” sample is much smaller, it seems that the 
model has a better fit with this sample, as given by the log-likelihood and information 
criteria statistics. In addition, it appears that the net transfers variable has a significant 
impact on labour mobility only in this sample.  
Regarding robustness of the estimates, similar results in terms of the impact of net 
transfers on output growth are obtained with the 1995-2005 dataset even when we 
include country dummies (see Table 4 below). In this case, the net transfers variable 
seems to be associated with higher outward population migration in both samples.  
Another interesting point that emerges from both Table 3 and Table 4 is that the 
(negative) direct impact of net transfers on growth is larger  in the sample of richer 
regions than in the sample of relatively poorer regions (as given by the coefficient of the 
variable net transfers_t in the first equation of the system). In addition, the average 
relative growth rate for the former sample is -0.21% p.a. during 1995-2005, while for the 
latter it stands at 0.16% (a significant difference as given by a one-sided t-test). Hence, it 
seems that while fiscal transfers impede output growth in both samples, they have a 
stronger growth-reducing effect on richer regions. This could lead to an “immiserising 
convergence” where convergence occurs thanks to the slow growth of the richer regions 
rather than by virtue of the faster growth in the poorer regions. 
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Table 4: Direct and indirect impact of net fiscal transfers on output convergence (1995 – 
2005): Splitting the sample based on the net transfer threshold found at 84%; country 
dummies included 
  System 1  
Net transfers < 84 
System 2  



























-9.987***   
(1.695) 
.245*  
 (.139)      -.879   
(1.118) 
-.124 
   (.156)     
Net transfers_t  
1.816***   
(.562) 
.108***   
(.011)      -.222**   
(.107) 
.052***   
(.009)     
Investment/gdp_t  
-5.085***   
(1.086)       -.002  
 (.017)      
Population  
migration_t  
-67.41***   
(16.056)       4.075**   
(1.854)      
Relative 
income/cap_t 
   -18.967***   
(1.061)       -18.944***   
(.544)   
Agriculture 
 share_t 
  -.410***   
(.055)     -.036***   
(.010)   




































1.02e+06   
(.000) 
Log-likelihood  




-2666.4    
 
  5474.9 
  5754.9 
-6320.8     
 
 12813.7    
 13245.5 
NT 381  1191 
IV.3. Accounting for EU Structural and Cohesion funds  
 
Our model also allows assessing the impact of EU transfers, which have the explicit 
objective of accelerating convergence, on regional growth differentials.  Additional fiscal 
related-variables for the European regions were obtained from the ESPON database, a 
research initiative supported by the European Commission.
25 
 ESPON includes data on structural and cohesion funds (SCF) spent at the NUTS-
2 regional level, according to the objectives of the structural and cohesion funds, mainly: 
(i) Structural Fund (SF) expenditure related to Regional Development and Productive 
Infrastructure (SF_reg.dev); (ii) SF expenditure related to Social Integration and Human 
Resources (SF_social), (iii) SF Fund expenditure related to Agriculture, Rural 
Development and Fishery (SF_agric); (iv) Cohesion Fund (CF) expenditure related to 
transportation, and (v) CF expenditure related to environment.  
                                                 
25  ESPON stands for European Spatial Planning Observation Network. The database is available at 
www.espon.eu   
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ESPON data are cumulative for the period 1994-1999,
26 expressed in euro terms 
and refer (to the extent possible) to the amounts actually spent out of the programmed 
amounts.
27 Given that the structural and cohesion funds were available for the respective 
period only for the old EU member states, our analysis will be restricted to EU-13 (cross-
section). The amounts under PHARE
28 programs granted for then-accession countries are 
also available, but they are comparatively too small to be meaningful for our analysis. To 
obtain annual amounts, we assume an even distribution over the six years. We then 
calculated two alternative measures: (i) in terms of GDP; (ii) in terms of population and 
relative to the EU-13 SCF expenditure per capita (see Table A4.1. of the Appendix 2 for 
more details and descriptive statistics). 
Table A4.2. in the Appendix 2 ranks the first thirty regions in terms of their total 
yearly SCF expenditure (as percent of GDP), and shows the level of the regions’ output 
per capita relative to the EU-19 average in 1995 and 2004. A quick inspection of this data 
indicates that receiving regions in Portugal and Spain seem to have performed well 
during the 10 year period, while most regions in Greece (with the notable exemption of 
Athens) and Italy have regressed in the output ranking.   
We include the structural and cohesion fund expenditure in our main empirical 
model by considering the impact of the amounts spent during 1994-1999 on the growth 
rate for the period 1999-2005 (the other explanatory variables are averages over the 
period 1999-2004). The results from the simultaneous equation system are shown in 
Table 5 below. To facilitate the comparison, we first re-estimate our baseline system for 
the restricted sample of the “old” EU-13 countries without incorporating SCF. System 2 
then includes the total expenditure under SCF in the growth equation and the structural 
fund expenditure dedicated to social and human resource objectives in the labour 
mobility equation. Moreover, we introduce a further equation linking the receipt of 
structural and cohesion funds to per capita output: 
 
1. Growth rate of relative GDP/cap 1999-2004 = f (Relative GDP/cap1999; Net fiscal 
 transfers1999-2004; Labour mobility1999-2004;   SCF_total1994-1999; controls1999-2004; 
 constant) 
2. Labour mobility1999-2004 = f (Relative GDPcap1999; Net fiscal transfers1999-2004;  
Unemployment1999-2004; SF_social1994-1999; constant)  
3. Net fiscal transfers1999-2004 = f (Relative income/cap1999; constant) 
4. SCF_total1999-2004 = f (Relative GDP/cap1999; constant) 
 
                                                 
26 Data correspond to the second European Commission programming period. Historical data for the first 
programming period (1989-1993) and the third period (2000-2006) are not (yet) available from ESPON.   
27 Where amounts spent are not available, programmed amounts are used instead.   
28  The PHARE programme is an EU pre-accession instrument whose objective is to assist applicant 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe in their preparation for joining the EU. 
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 Table 5: Direct and indirect impact of net fiscal transfers and EU structural and 
cohesion funds on output convergence: NUTS-2 regions in EU-13, 1999-2005. 






































-40.64***   
(11.201)   
-28.00***   
(7.165)    -95.53***   
(32.089)   
-28.85***   
(7.125)    -66.84***   
(8.129)   
Net transfers_avg  -1.587***   
(.422) 
-1.361***   
(.299)    -4.163***   
(1.369) 
-1.425***   
(.297)     
Investment/gdp_avg  -.695***   
(.238)     -2.611**   
(1.102)     
Agriculture 
 share_avg 
-.443**   
(.190)     .094 
   (.441)     
Labour 
mobility_avg 
-.267***   
(.029)     -1.763***   
(.495)     
Unemployment_avg    -.428* 
   (.242)     -.235   
(.242)     
Relative 
income/cap (ln)     -25.84***   
(1.840)     -25.54***   
(1.851) 
 
SCF_total      .232**  
 (.113)     

































N 174  174 
 
The conclusions from the results of System 1 remain broadly the same as for the 
estimation of the baseline model: net transfers continue to have a negative impact on 
growth and outward labour mobility among regions of EU-13 only. The difference is that 
when we exclude the regions in the new EU member states, the negative impact of net 
transfers on growth is larger than before (-1.587 compared to -.559 when all regions were 
included).  
The variable net transfers ultimately reflects also the impact of those EU transfers 
reaching households in the targeted regions. When we control in System 2 for both 
transfer variables (net transfers and SCF_total) the coefficient of the former in the output 
growth equation reflects the net impact of the two variables. Hence, based on this model, 
the impact of net transfers to households excluding EU funds is found even more harmful 
to growth than before (as given by a higher negative coefficient for the variable net 
transfers in System 2 compared to System 1).    
  Regarding the impact of EU transfers, we find some evidence that the overall 
spending under structural and cohesion funds have a positive impact on regional output 
growth (but there is no significant impact on labour mobility). We also used the 
disaggregated components of the structural fund expenditure (since the cohesion funds 
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expenditure are smaller and granted to only fewer regions, we do not this category as a 
separate variable). The correlation between the three SF components is moderate 
reflecting the different economic objectives targeted (the highest correlation coefficient 
of .56 is between SF_reg.dev and SF_social). We can therefore include all the three 
disaggregated components without being confronted with problems of multicollinerity. 
With the separate categories included, it is somewhat surprising to find that the positive 
impact on growth comes from structural funds dedicated to the objective of social and 
human resource development, while the two other components turn to be insignificant in 
explaining growth (in some specifications, SF expenditure for agriculture is significantly 
associated with future negative growth).  
  However, when country dummies are included, the significance of the impact of 
EU funds - either cumulative or the disaggregated components - on growth disappears. 
National aspects are relevant in this case in terms of institutional issues, efficiency of 
spending the EU funds, and amounts available for co-financing,
29  but not how these 
funds are conceived and allocated. Overall, the lack of significance with country 
dummies remains problematic for a robust interpretation of the impact of EU funds on 
growth. Yet, as in the case of fiscal transfers, this result does not exclude the possibility 
of more robust results over a longer period of time.   
 
V. Conclusions and areas of future research 
 
The following conclusions emerge from the analysis. 
  First, we find that disposable income of households across European regions in 
EU-19 converged during the period 1995-2005 at a higher speed than primary income, 
with the lowest speed obtained for output per capita. 
  Second, while net fiscal transfers contribute to reducing disparities in income 
available to households at the regional level and thus achieve their intended distributional 
goal, they also impede output growth: there is a negative impact of net transfers on 
growth in receiving regions and small contributors, and a negative impact, as well, of net 
taxes on growth in paying regions (the big contributors). This may point to an 
“immiserising convergence” with output growth rates in receiving poor regions declining 
by less than in paying rich regions in reaction to the tax-transfer scheme. The fact that 
fiscal transfers contribute to reducing regional disparities in disposable income, but they 
are not similarly successful in reducing disparities in output per capita poses the question 
of a trade-off between distributional policies and policies targeted to growth and 
economic convergence. This trade-off is particularly important from a policy perspective.  
  Third, there is some evidence that fiscal transfers impede labour commuting, even 
when we control for national differences with country dummy variables. While this 
seems to be beneficial for economic growth (higher outward labour implies lower per-
capita GDP growth), it is likely to impede factor adjustment. Our conclusions regarding 
(short-distance) labour mobility have to be regarded with caution given that there are 
other factors likely to have a significant impact on labour commuting (such as the real 
                                                 
29 Unfortunately, such data are not available from ESPON. 
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estate price differentials) that we are not able to control for. These factors tend to matter 
most for relatively poor regions neighbouring very rich regions, and less for clusters of 
regions at similar levels of economic activity.   
  Fourth, EU structural and cohesion funds spent during 1994-1999 are found to 
have had a slight positive impact on economic growth, mainly through the human 
development component, but the results do not seem to be robust when country dummies 
are included. 
  Finally, while EU regions seem to converge as a pool, there is no strong evidence 
for within-country convergence. In fact, the evidence disappears in most specifications 
when we include country dummies.  
  Further research is needed to bolster these conclusions:  
  As regards the within-country convergence, it would be useful to analyse the 
disaggregated impact of fiscal policy, including by looking at country-specific regional 
convergence (e.g. in Germany, Spain, Italy, etc.) and thus taking into account a broader 
range of fiscal instruments.  
  Accounting for spatial dependency with spatial econometric models (Spatial Lag 
or Spatial Error Models) could also be valuable since location and regional spill-over 
effects are likely to play an important role in economic convergence. 
  Last, but certainly not least, investigating more thoroughly the role of labour 
migration in the process of regional output convergence would be essential, especially 
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Appendix 1: List of NUTS 2 regions included in the analysis 
 
Austria  
Burgenland (A), Niederösterreich, Wien, Kärnten, Steiermark, Oberösterreich, Salzburg, 
Tirol, Vorarlberg 
Belgium  
Région de Bruxelles-Capitale/Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest, Prov. Antwerpen, Prov. 
Limburg (B), Prov. Oost-Vlaanderen, Prov. Vlaams Brabant, Prov. West-Vlaanderen, 
Prov. Brabant Wallon, Prov. Hainaut, Prov. Liège, Prov. Luxembourg (B), Prov. Namur 
Czech Republic 
Praha, Strední Cechy, Jihozápad, Severozápad, Severovýchod, Jihovýchod, Strední 
Morava, Moravskoslezsko 
Germany 
Stuttgart, Karlsruhe, Freiburg, Tübingen, Oberbayern, Niederbayern, Oberpfalz, 
Oberfranken, Mittelfranken, Unterfranken, Schwaben, Berlin , Brandenburg - Nordost, 
Brandenburg - Südwest, Bremen, Hamburg, Darmstadt, Gießen, Kassel, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, Braunschweig, Hannover, Lüneburg, Weser-Ems, Düsseldorf, Köln, 
Münster, Detmold, Arnsberg, Koblenz, Trier, Rheinhessen-Pfalz, Saarland, Chemnitz, 




Galicia, Principado de Asturias, Cantabria, Pais Vasco, Comunidad Foral de Navarra, La 
Rioja, Aragón, Comunidad de Madrid, Castilla y León, Castilla-la Mancha, Extremadura, 
Cataluña, Comunidad Valenciana, Illes Balears, Andalucia, Región de Murcia, Canarias 
(ES)  
Finland 
Itä-Suomi, Etelä-Suomi, Länsi-Suomi, Pohjois-Suomi, Åland 
France 
Île de France, Champagne-Ardenne, Picardie, Haute-Normandie, Centre, Basse-
Normandie, Bourgogne, Nord - Pas-de-Calais, Lorraine, Alsace, Franche-Comté, Pays de 
la Loire, Bretagne, Poitou-Charentes, Aquitaine, Midi-Pyrénées, Limousin, Rhône-Alpes, 
Auvergne, Languedoc-Roussillon, Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Corse 
Greece 
Anatoliki Makedonia Thraki, Kentriki Makedonia, Dytiki Makedonia, Thessalia, Ipeiros, 
Ionia Nisia, Dytiki Ellada, Sterea Ellada, Peloponnisos, Attiki, Voreio Aigaio, Notio 
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Ireland 
Border Midlands and Western, Southern and Eastern 
Italy 
Piemonte, Valle d'Aosta/Vallée d'Aoste, Liguria, Lombardia, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia, Emilia-Romagna, Toscana, Umbria, Marche, Lazio, Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, 






Groningen, Friesland (NL), Drenthe, Overijssel, Gelderland, Flevoland, Utrecht , Noord-
Holland, Zuid-Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant, Limburg (NL)  
Poland 
Lódzkie, Mazowieckie, Malopolskie, Slaskie, Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Swietokrzyskie, 
Podlaskie, Wielkopolskie, Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Dolnoslaskie, Opolskie, 
Kujawsko-Pomorskie, Warminsko-Mazurskie, Pomorskie  
Portugal  
Norte, Algarve, Centro (PT), Lisboa, Alentejo, Região Autónoma dos Açores (PT), 
Região Autónoma da Madeira (PT) 
Sweden 
Stockholm, Östra Mellansverige, Småland med öarna, Sydsverige, Västsverige, Norra 
Mellansverige, Mellersta Norrland, Övre Norrland 
Slovakia  
Bratislavský kraj, Západné Slovensko, Stredné Slovensko, Východné Slovensko  
United Kingdom  
Tees Valley and Durham, Northumberland Tyne and Wear, Cumbria, Cheshire, Greater 
Manchester, Lancashire, Merseyside, East Yorkshire and Northern Lincolnshire, North 
Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, 
Leicestershire Rutland and Northants, Lincolnshire, Herefordshire Worcestershire and 
Warks, Shropshire and Staffordshire, West Midlands, East Anglia, Bedfordshire 
Hertfordshire, Essex, Inner London, Outer London, Berkshire Bucks and Oxfordshire, 
Surrey East and West Sussex, Hampshire and Isle of Wight, Kent, Gloucestershire 
Wiltshire and Bristol/Bath area, Dorset and Somerset, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly, 
Devon West Wales and The Valleys, East Wales, Eastern Scotland, South Western 
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Appendix 2: Methodology and Data Description  
 
Table A1: Eurostat methodology for output and income indicators 
Variable name  Description  Comments  Source 
Regional GDP    GDP at regional level is 
calculated using the output 
approach = the total value of 
goods and services produced in a 
region with labour employed in 
that region. 
 
The figure is place-of-production 
or “place-of work” based. 
National GDP data are 
compiled by the national 
statistics offices in accordance 
with ESA 95.  
National figures are then 
distributed across the regions 
on the basis of regional 
contributions to the gross value 
added. 
 







balance of primary 
income  
Income of private households 
generated directly from market 
transactions: 
•  income from the sale of 
labour as a factor of 
production; 
•  property income – interest, 
dividends, rents; 
•  income from operating 
surplus and self-employment 
minus  
•  interest and rent payable 
= balance of primary income  
 
The figure is “place-of-residence” 
based. 
Data at regional level (NUTS-
2) are calculated according to 
ESA95 by the Member States 
and reported to Eurostat 
 
The figure is “place-of-
residence” based. 
 
Primary income is used as a 
basis for calculating disposable 
income (or the secondary 










Income of private households, 
after government redistribution 
policies. 
= Balance of primary income 
plus  
•  social benefits and transfers 
other than in kind (resources) 
minus 
•  current taxes on income, 
wealth, etc 
•  social contributions; 
•  other current transfers paid 
 
The figure is “place-of-residence” 
based. 
Data at regional level (NUTS-
2) are calculated according to 
ESA95 by the Member States 









Note: An alternative (experimental) calculation of the path from GDP to household disposable income 
following the national accounts approach is the following (see Eurostat Theme 1 Note 06/2003): 
GDP at market prices 
 + Balance of primary income from the rest of the world 
 -  Fixed capital consumption   
------------------------------------------------- 
 = Net national income at market prices 
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 = Disposable income of all sectors       ( 1 0 0 % )  
-  Disposable income of financial/non-financial corporations             (average 4%)  
and private non-profit organizations 
-  Disposable income of the State (general government)              (average 25%) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
=      Disposable income of private households                (average 71%) 
 
Disposable income of households is by far the largest component of total disposable income (for the EU-
15 average, it amounted to 71% in 2000).  
 
Table A2: Data description, Eurostat, Regional Statistics  





per capita  
(rel_Y) 
Balance of primary income of 
households at NUTS2 level, in 
purchasing power standard based 
on final consumption per 
inhabitant, relative to the EU-19 
average  
(the EU-19 average is calculated 
as the sum of country income over 
the sum of population for the 19 
countries in the sample; The same 
calculation applies to the other 
relative categories).  
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat 
(Regional Statistics) 





Mean  = 96.6 
Median = 101.4 
St.dev. =   29.9 







Disposable income of households 
at NUTS 2 level, in purchasing 
power standard based on final 
consumption per inhabitant, 
relative to the EU-19 average  
 
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat 
(Regional Statistics) 





N = 230 
Mean = 97.2 
Median = 103.1 
St.dev. =    26.5       





Gross domestic product (GDP) at 
current market prices at NUTS2 
level, in Purchasing Power 
Standards per inhabitant, relative 
to the EU-19 average 
 
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat 
(Regional Statistics) 




N = 250  
Mean = 96.5 
Median = 96.0 
St.dev. =     32.2 
Range = [33.5;     
288.3] 
Growth rate of 
relative per-
capita output  
(avgGDPrate) 
Average annual growth rate of 
relative per-capita GDP at NUTS-
2 regional level calculated as: 
 ln(rel_gdp) t+1 - ln(rel_gdp) t (%) 
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat (DG 
Regio) 
 
N = 230  
Mean =  .04 
Median = .11 
St.dev. = 2.67 
Range = [-7.6; 
13.6] 
Net transfers  Proxy for fiscal policy 
(cumulative impact of transfers to 
households and tax policy) 
calculated as the ratio between  
disposable income and primary 
income at NUTS-2 regional level 
Transfers t = DY t / Y t (%) 
A similar measure constructed in 
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat (DG 
Regio) 
 
N = 230 (Statistics 
in parentheses 
without the Greek 
region Ionia Nisia)   
Mean = 90.16  
(90.3)   
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terms of relative incomes, 
Transfers_rel t = rel_DY t / rel_Y t 
(%) 
 
St.dev. = 8.3 (8.0) 
Range = [59.4;   
109] 
([69.6; 109])    
Labour mobility  Proxy for (short distance) outward 
labour mobility or labour 
commuting calculated as the ratio 
of a NUTS-2 region’s residents 
working outside the region and 
those working inside the region 
(%) 
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat (DG 
Regio): 
category: reg_lfe2ecomm 
Employment and commuting 
among NUTS level 2 regions 
in thousands persons by 
wkplace: 
- oth_reg: Working in 
another region 
- same_reg: Working in the 
same region 
N = 217  
Mean =  10.12 
Median = 6.14 
St.dev. = 13.05 
Range = [0; 93.5] 
Population 
migration 
Population outward migration by 
NUTS-2 region (normalized to 
average population) calculated as: 
= - [Change in population as of 
Jan.1
st (yearly) – natural 
population increase]/annual avg. 
population (%)  
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat (DG 
Regio): categories: 
-  reg_d2jan - Population 
at 1st January; 
-  reg_d3natmo - Live 
births; Deaths 




Mean =  -.36 
Median = -.22 
St.dev. =  .56 
Range = [ -2.4; .6] 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate by region at 
NUTS 2 level  
Eurostat (DG Regio) 
(category: reg_lfu3rt,  
age: y15_max) 
N = 226   
Mean = 9.09 
Median = 7.8 
St.dev. = 5.07 
Range: [2.4; 24.9] 
Agriculture 
share 
Share of agriculture (and related 
NACE branches) in total 
employees' compensation  (%) at 
NUTS-2 regional level 
Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Eurostat (DG 
Regio): 
Category: reg_e2rem 
Compensation of employees 
at NUTS level 2 
-  NACE total: All NACE 
branches; 
-  NACE a_b Agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and 
fishing 
N = 230 
Mean = 1.71     
Median = 1.11 
St.dev. = 1.84 
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Table A3.1. The thirty largest payers and their relative output per capita  
(10-year averages for the period 1995-2004)   
Code Region  Country  Transfers  (%)  Relative 
GDP/cap (%) 
se11 Stockholm  Sweden  70.74  160.02 
nl31 Utrecht  Netherlands  71.23  151.80 
nl23 Flevoland  Netherlands  72.27  90.25 
nl32 Noord-Holland  Netherlands  73.76  143.76 
nl33 Zuid-Holland  Netherlands  74.02  127.02 
be24  Prov. Vlaams Brabant  Belgium  74.31  120.09 
nl41 Noord-Brabant  Netherlands  74.79  122.02 
be31 Prov.  Brabant  Wallon  Belgium  75.26  106.89 
nl22 Gelderland  Netherlands  75.86  106.05 
sk01 Bratislavský  kraj  Slovakia  76.62  107.88 
fr10  Île de France  France  76.68  168.16 
be23 Prov.  Oost-Vlaanderen  Belgium  77.31  103.54 
fi18 Etelä-Suomi  Finland  77.46  125.25 
de21 Oberbayern  Germany  77.48  162.26 
be21 Prov.  Antwerpen  Belgium  77.53  137.97 
de71 Darmstadt  Germany  77.71  157.94 
se23 Västsverige  Sweden  77.92  112.62 
nl21 Overijssel  Netherlands  77.95  105.66 
nl34 Zeeland  Netherlands  78.28  110.30 
se21 Småland  med  öarna  Sweden  79.01  106.17 
se12 Östra  Mellansverige  Sweden  79.24  101.71 
be22 Prov.  Limburg  (B)  Belgium  79.34  99.16 
nl13 Drenthe  Netherlands  79.64  98.93 
be10 
Région de Bruxelles-Capitale/Brussels 
Hoofdstedelijk Gewest  Belgium  79.96  239.17 
es30  Comunidad de Madrid  Spain  80.36  122.30 
be25 Prov.  West-Vlaanderen  Belgium  80.45  110.36 
be35 Prov.  Namur  Belgium  80.57  81.93 
nl42 Limburg  (NL)  Netherlands  80.58  109.04 
nl12 Friesland  (NL)  Netherlands  80.89  101.15 
uki1  Inner London  United Kingdom  80.98  265.90 
Transfers are calculated as the ratio between disposable income and income (%) by region. Relative 
GDP/capita is regional GDP/cap in PPS relative to the EU-19 average (%). See Table A2 for details. 
 
Table A3.2. The largest transfer receivers and their relative output per capita  
(10-year averages for the period 1995-2004)   
Code Region  Country  Transfers  (%)  Relative 
GDP/cap (%) 
ded1 Chemnitz  Germany  107.73  75.28 
pl31 Lubelskie  Poland  106.52  32.75 
pl33 Swietokrzyskie  Poland  106.45  34.75 
ukl1  West Wales and The Valleys  United Kingdom  105.10  75.31 
dee0 Sachsen-Anhalt  Germany  104.63  76.00 
ukk3  Cornwall and Isles of Scilly  United Kingdom  104.04  69.46 
pl32 Podkarpackie  Poland  103.93  32.62 
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Code Region  Country  Transfers  (%)  Relative 
GDP/cap (%) 
ukk4 Devon  United  Kingdom  103.68  88.76 
pt16 Centro  (PT)  Portugal  103.40  61.27 
gr30 Attiki  Greece  103.13  96.56 
ukd5 Merseyside  United  Kingdom  103.06  79.31 
ded2 Dresden  Germany  102.33  81.85 
ded3 Leipzig  Germany  102.29  85.00 
pl34 Podlaskie  Poland  102.16  34.60 
pl11 Lódzkie  Poland  102.09  40.57 
gr25 Peloponnisos  Greece  102.03  73.89 
pl21 Malopolskie  Poland  101.86  39.13 
pt18 Alentejo  Portugal  101.41  65.75 
deg0 Thüringen  Germany  101.36  76.02 
pl62 Warminsko-Mazurskie  Poland  100.72  35.25 
itf6 Calabria  Italy  100.32  67.77 
pl43 Lubuskie  Poland  100.24  40.80 
gr41 Voreio  Aigaio  Greece  100.16  64.97 
gr11 Anatoliki  Makedonia,  Thraki  Greece  100.08  61.57 
Transfers are calculated as the ratio between disposable income and income (%) by region. Relative 
GDP/capita is the regional GDP/cap in PPS relative to the EU-19 average (%). See Table A2 for details. 
 
 
Chart A3.3. Relationship between transfers and elative per-capita output  
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March 2009Table A4.1. ESPON data description  
Variable name  Description  Source 
Descriptive 
statistics  






Structural Fund and Cohesion Fund 
expenditure - All funds included in 
Operational Programmes and SPDs, 
Objectives 1, 2, 3, 5b and 6, in EUR terms, 
cumulative, for the period 1994-1999. 
 
Variable in relative terms are calculated as 
follows: 
1. Relative to GDP: 
•  first calculate an annual average SCF 
expenditure assuming equal amounts  
during the 6-year period for all EU-13 
countries, except Austria, Sweden and 
Finland, for which a 5-year period is 
used; 
•  divide the above measure to the 
nominal GDP in EUR terms in the year 
1999 (%) 
2. Relative to population and the EU-13 
average:  
•  divide the measure from the first step 
to the average population; 
•  normalize to EU-13 average (total SCF 
expenditure over total population) (%) 
 
Same methodology applied to each 
disaggregated expenditure category (below) 
to obtain the variables in relative terms. 
Authors’ 
calculations based 
on data from 
ESPON and 






of the Structural 
Funds” (Nordregio 
2005) 
N = 195  
Mean =  0.50 
Median = 0.11 
St.dev. = 0.90 








SF_reg.dev  Structural Fund expenditure related to 
Regional Development and Productive 
Infrastructure (Obj. 1, 2 and 6 ERDF), in 
EUR terms, cumulative, for the period 
1994-1999. 
ESPON   N = 195  
Mean =  0.33 
Median = 0.05 
St.dev. = 0.70 
Range = [0; 5.19] 
SF_social  Structural Fund expenditure related to 
Social Integration and Human Resources 
(Obj. 1, 2, 3 and 6 ESF), in EUR terms, 
cumulative, for the period 1994-1999. 
ESPON   N = 195  
Mean =  0.08 
Median = 0.04 
St.dev. = 0.11 
Range = [0; 0.78] 
SF_agric  Structural Fund expenditure related to 
Agriculture, Rural Development and 
Fishery (Obj. 5b and 6, EAGGF, IAGF), in 
EUR terms, cumulative, for the period 
1994-1999. 
ESPON   N = 195  
Mean =  0.06 
Median = 0.02 
St.dev. = 0.11 
Range = [0; 1.09] 
Note (source: ESPON): Data manipulated in some cases 
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Table A4.2. The thirty largest EU fund spenders during 1994-1999 and their relative 
output per capita in 1995 and 2004   













pt20  Região Autónoma dos Açores (PT)  Portugal  5.99  54.47  62.40  14.6 
gr13 Dytiki  Makedonia  Greece  5.46  80.19  71.41  -10.9 
pt30  Região Autónoma da Madeira (PT)  Portugal  4.07  69.17  88.70  28.2 
gr21 Ipeiros  Greece  4.00  58.02  68.69  18.4 
gr11  Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki  Greece  3.51  65.02  61.81  -4.9 
gr23 Dytiki  Ellada  Greece  3.15  66.27  56.46  -14.8 
gr14 Thessalia  Greece  2.91  70.47  69.94  -0.8 
es43 Extremadura  Spain  2.52  55.81  64.04  14.7 
itf5 Basilicata  Italy  2.01  78.42  72.05  -8.1 
gr41 Voreio  Aigaio  Greece  1.99  66.42  61.91  -6.8 
gr43 Kriti  Greece  1.89  78.60  80.00  1.8 
pt15 Algarve  Portugal  1.81  73.30  74.52  1.7 
pt18 Alentejo  Portugal  1.80  63.33  65.87  4.0 
pt11 Norte  Portugal  1.75  59.98  56.52  -5.8 
ie01  Border, Midlands and Western  Ireland  1.75  74.29  98.37  32.4 
gr24 Sterea  Ellada  Greece  1.74  119.38  97.08  -18.7 
es42 Castilla-la  Mancha  Spain  1.70  71.46  76.07  6.5 
gr12 Kentriki  Makedonia  Greece  1.69  77.61  73.13  -5.8 
itf2 Molise  Italy  1.61  86.73  73.56  -15.2 
es13 Cantabria  Spain  1.47  80.96  93.71  15.7 
es12  Principado de Asturias  Spain  1.41  76.74  83.18  8.4 
gr25 Peloponnisos  Greece  1.41  71.87  75.23  4.7 
pt16 Centro  (PT)  Portugal  1.35  59.66  60.78  1.9 
es11 Galicia  Spain  1.33  71.02  77.68  9.4 
pt17 Lisboa  Portugal  1.32  100.18  100.61  0.4 
es41  Castilla y León  Spain  1.31  83.60  90.61  8.4 
gr30 Attiki  Greece  1.26  86.18  119.07  38.2 
es61 Andalucia  Spain  1.20  64.94  74.50  14.7 
es24 Aragón  Spain  1.19  93.76  102.80  9.6 
itf6 Calabria  Italy  1.14  68.48  65.20  -4.8 
Note: SCF_total as % of GDP represents the Total Structural and Cohesion Fund expenditure, annual   
average for the period 1994-1999 relative to the 1999 GDP.  Relative GDP/capita is regional 
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